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Determinants of Compensation:
A Study of Pay, Performance,
and Gender Differences for
Fundraising Professionals
Debra J. Mesch, Patrick M. Rooney
This study examines the determinants of compensation for
fundraising professionals by addressing the following research
questions: (1) Is there a significant pay-performance relation-
ship? (2) What are the factors that affect bonus and salary? 
(3) Is there a gender-pay gap for individuals who are in the role
of fundraisers? Data were collected over a four-year period from
a national sample of fundraising professionals employed across
all industry classifications. Amount of money raised was the 
primary performance variable of interest. Bivariate tests for 
differences between males and females, as well as two-stage
simultaneous regressions, were used to determine the effects of
fundraising performance on the pay of fundraisers. Results indi-
cated a significant and positive pay-performance linkage across
all fundraising positions, particularly for chief development offi-
cers, as well as a consistent gender-pay gap across fundraising
positions.
ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN some theoretical work on compen-sation in nonprofits (for example, Hallock, 2000; Ruhm andBorkoski, 2003; Steinberg, 1990; Weisbrod, 1988), we have
little understanding of the actual determinants of compensation in
nonprofits from an empirical point of view (Hallock, 2000). One rea-
son for the lack of empirical testing is that given the constraints and
characteristics of the nonprofit sector, examining pay is problematic
(Hallock, 2000). However, without a body of research that specifically
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focuses on compensation in the nonprofits, it is difficult to deter-
mine whether incentive systems that are found to be successful in
the private sector will have their intended effects in the nonprofit
arena.
There are several reasons that the lack of empirical research and
validation of compensation systems in the nonprofit sector is trou-
bling. First, compensation packages have exploded for many chief
executives in the nonprofit sector (Schwinn and Wilhelm, 2003).
Salaries paid in 2003 to the top executives of the nation’s largest non-
profits rose by twice the inflation rate, and the salaries of CEOs of
the largest charities and foundations more than doubled from 1997
to 2002; in fact, they received higher percentage raises than did their
counterparts in the corporate world (Schwinn and Wilhelm, 2003).
Second, although use of performance-based compensation plans is
a relatively new practice in nonprofits, such practices are becoming
more prevalent and are expected to increase in the future (Alvarado,
1996; Bailey and Risher, 1996; Deckop and Cirka, 2000). Some stud-
ies have found that 25 percent of nonprofits offer managers the
opportunity to earn cash compensation—usually tied to achievement
of performance measures (Rocco, 1991, 1992). Third, management
pay in the nonprofit world is becoming more highly scrutinized.
New legislation requires nonprofits to document how much they pay
their top management as well as require that boards justify and out-
line the compensation determination process (Preston, 2004). “If the
salaries are found to be higher than expected and higher than those
found in similar charities,” fines could be levied and boards could
be required to return the amount overpaid (Hallock, 2002a, p. 378).
Our study uses compensation survey data from a large national
membership association—the Association of Fundraising Profes-
sionals (AFP)—a professional society responsible for generating phil-
anthropic support for a wide variety of nonprofits. Its mission is to
advance philanthropy by enabling people and organizations to prac-
tice ethical and effective fundraising—activities that include educa-
tion, training, mentoring, research, credentialing and advocacy.
Membership associations may be defined as “mutual benefit
organizations, incorporated to serve their members’ interests”
(Tschirhart, 2006, p. 523), formally organized and usually not rec-
ompensed for their participation (Knoke, 1986). Although mem-
bership associations make up a significant component of the
nonprofit sector—consisting of 33 percent of the nonprofits regis-
tered in the United States (Tschirhart, 2006)—there is a paucity of
research on this sector and virtually no examination of executive pay
in this type of nonprofit.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of our study is to address the following research ques-
tions: (1) What are the significant determinants of compensation for
Compensation
packages have
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individuals who are employed as fundraising professionals in non-
profits? More specifically, does performance have a significant effect
on compensation for these professionals? (2) What are the key deter-
minants of bonus and salary for these individuals? (3) Is there a
gender-pay gap for individuals who are in the role of fundraisers for
nonprofits?
First, we test to see whether there is a relationship between
fundraiser performance and compensation. We selected fundraising
professionals because of the implicit relationship between their role
in the organization and performance (that is, “contributions raised”)
to better test the pay-performance relationship. Performance can be
appropriately rewarded only if it can be accurately measured and
directly related to employee efforts. Presumably we would expect to
see a more direct linkage between job content or job responsibilities
and performance for individuals who are in the role of fundrais-
ing rather than other types of positions in nonprofits. In fact, fundraising
has been described as a profession that is mission driven, offering clear
goals, advancement based on results, and work performance that is
quantifiable (Tifft, 1992). In our study, we use “money raised,” a
quantifiable measure of performance that directly relates to the efforts
of fundraisers and is a measure of success. Furthermore, fundraising
professionals are unique to the nonprofit sector and traditionally not
found in for-profit firms. Few studies have been conducted that look
at determinants of compensation for these individuals.
Second, we disaggregate compensation into bonus and salary in
order to examine the pay-performance relationship more fully. Is the
pay-performance relationship for fundraisers significant for bonus,
for salary, or both? Studies comparing for-profit and nonprofit orga-
nizations have found that nonprofits paid greater base salaries, lower
bonuses, and lower total compensation than for-profits, ceteris
paribus (Roomkin and Weisbrod, 1999; Weisbrod, 1983). However,
for fundraisers, where the measure of performance is objective and
measurable (as is primarily the case in for-profit firms), there may be
a more contingent relationship between performance and bonus
because it is a reliable way to reward achievement of goals. Unlike
other pay-performance studies, under these conditions we may actu-
ally find a relationship between performance and bonuses.
It is important to note that there is nothing illegal about being
paid for performance as a fundraiser—and, in fact, this may be a way
to motivate employees to increase performance (Harrison, 1995).
According to ethical guidelines, fundraisers are allowed to accept
performance-based compensation (Sczudlo, 2003). Although we
would expect to see a stronger relationship between pay and perfor-
mance for fundraisers than perhaps other individuals, we need to
bear in mind the ethical standards facing fundraisers in nonprofits
and the importance of upholding the public trust. “In fact, nowhere
is ethical behavior more essential, or its absence more damaging, than
in philanthropic fundraising” (Sczudlo, 2003, p. 30). As such,
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the pay-for-performance relationship for fundraisers may be some-
what suppressed, where a “commission” or percentage-based pay for
performance is prohibited.
Third, we focus on issues of gender equity in the fundraising
workforce. Over the past decade, there has been an increase in the
memberships of the top three professional organizations representing
fundraisers, to the point now where the majority of professionals
are women (Conry, 1998). Furthermore, more women than men are
entering this profession as paid employees where women occupy all
fundraising job categories across all types of nonprofit organizations
(Conry, 1998). Conry (1991) refers to this phenomenon as “the fem-
inization of fundraising” and cautions that this could have negative
implications on the salaries, prestige, and status of a previously
male-dominated occupation in which fundraising is seen as
“women’s work.”
Much research has been conducted on the gender-pay gap in the
private sector (for example, Bertrand and Hallock, 2001; Blau and
Ferber, 1992; Chauvin and Ash, 1994; Gerhart, 1990; Groshen, 1991;
Harris, Gilbreath, and Sunday, 2002; Mohan and Ruggiero, 2003;
Rose and Hartmann, 2004; Wood, Corcoran, and Courant, 1993),
indicating that women are paid significantly less than men, even
when controlling for the industry, firm size, occupation, human cap-
ital, performance, and organizational structural factors that are tra-
ditionally associated with pay differentials. Although the nonprofit
sector is dominated by women, very little research addresses wage
differences between men and women (Hallock, 2000; Steinberg and
Jacobs, 1994). In our study, we investigate whether this finding per-
sists in the nonprofit sector, in a profession where there is a quan-
tifiable measure of performance as well as a preponderance of women
recently entering the profession.
Compensation in Nonprofit Organizations
Much has been written regarding the theoretical reasons for differ-
ences between compensation in the for-profit and nonprofit sector
and why compensation systems found in for-profit firms may not
generalize to nonprofits (see Ballou and Weisbrod, 2003; Hallock,
2000; Leete, 2001; Preston, 1989; Steinberg, 1990; Weisbrod, 1986,
1988; Young and Steinberg, 1995 for discussion of this literature). A
primary difference is that nonprofits operate under the “nondistribu-
tion constraint” (Hansmann, 1980), thereby prohibiting distribution
of profits to owners, and thus restricting organizations as to the type of
compensation practices as well as the form of compensation that
can be offered to its managers and employees. Given the nondistrib-
ution constraint, “performance pay in nonprofits has historically not
been very significant,” even though nonprofits are not precluded
legally from engaging in this practice (Hallock, 2000, p. 259). Several
recent studies, however, have found a strong, positive link between
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the assets of a nonprofit and the pay of its top manager (for example,
Brickley and Van Horn, 2002; Hallock, 2002a). Gray and Benson
(2003) found that when resource efficiency was used as an indicator
of performance, nonprofit executive compensation was based, at least
in part, on organizational performance, although client satisfaction
had no effect. A recent study by Carroll, Hughes, and Luksetich
(2005) found a positive relationship between executive compensa-
tion and performance when performance was measured as revenue
per dollar of noncompensation expenditure. However, this analysis
revealed that compensation and performance were simultaneously
determined.
The nondistribution constraint in the nonprofit sector leads to a
“sorting” of managers among the two sectors where “managers with
the least aversion to risk and the weakest preference for leading an
organization that has goals other than profit maximization” are more
attracted to the for-profit rather than the nonprofit sector (Roomkin
and Weisbrod, 1999, p. 778). Given that the nondistribution con-
straint restricts managerial discretion—particularly regarding com-
pensation decisions—managers, as well as other employees, may sort
themselves according to the type of organization that they find most
compatible with their preferences. That is, individuals may be will-
ing to “donate” their paid labor to a nonprofit cause that they care
about by accepting less compensation (Frank, 1996).
A second significant difference between compensation in the for-
profit and nonprofit sectors has to do with the way in which perfor-
mance is measured. Unlike for-profit firms where the bottom-line
performance is focused on making a profit and demonstration of
results, nonprofits conduct business in pursuit of a social mission,
where ideal information on performance is often unobtainable, costly,
abstract, and not easily quantified (Weisbrod, 1988). Finding appro-
priate performance metrics to satisfy stakeholders, as well as deter-
mining which performance indicators should be tied to pay, is much
more difficult (Hallock, 2000; Handy and Katz, 1998; Steinberg,
1990). Consequently, nonprofit boards often rely on more indirect and
imperfect measures of performance, such as activity or process mea-
sures (Weisbrod, 1988). As such, nonprofits must choose between
rewarding what is easily measured—even though this may not reward
the desired outcomes—incurring costs by devising better measures or
by not rewarding performance at all (Weisbrod, 1988).
However, in comparison to other types of positions in nonprof-
its, fundraising actually is results oriented, and outcomes can be mea-
sured (Duronio and Loessin, 1991). This is not to imply that
organizations providing fundraisers with specific goals are engaging
in unethical behavior—or that they will be more ethical and pro-
ductive if the focus is on process rather than on the results achieved.
Instead, the role of fundraisers requires an understanding of the bal-
ance between “concern for results with concern for how results are
achieved” (Durnio and Loessin, 1991, p. 129). In fact, fundraisers
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who do not have specific, measurable goals and are not judged by
what they accomplish may leave more room for unethical behavior
than if evaluated on actual performance (Duronio and Loessin,
1991). However, it has been suggested that “incentive contracts for
fundraisers may lead to a perception among donors that their con-
tributions are being diverted away from the organization’s major pur-
pose and toward fundraiser compensation” (Carroll, Hughes, and
Luksetich, 2005, p. 20).
Gender and Pay
Research efforts over the past three decades “have attempted to disen-
tangle factors that account for the gender-pay gap” (Renner, Rives, and
Bowlin, 2002, p. 332), and a great deal of theoretical work has been
developed in explaining the reasons that these differences occur (for
example, Blau, 1998; Blau and Ferber, 1992; Blau, Ferber, and Winkler,
1998; Weichselbaumer, 2004). Reports in the popular press give an
account of surveys that indicate senior female executives as well as
other top positions of our nation’s nonprofits are routinely paid less
than men in similar jobs: as high as a 50 percent gender differential
exists for CEOs (Lewin, 2001; Lipman, 2002). The pay gap is greatest
among the largest nonprofits (Lipman, 2002; GuideStar, 2005), per-
sisting even across comparable job titles and responsibilities (Williams,
2003), controlling for organization size (GuideStar, 2005).
Recent empirical research on nonprofits has found similar results.
Although a few studies have found that CEO gender was not signifi-
cantly related to compensation of nonprofits (for example, Oster, 1998;
Preston, 1989), the majority of studies have found just the opposite
(for example, Hallock, 2002b; Gibelman, 2000; Gray and Benson,
2003; Werner, Konopaske, and Gemeinhardt, 2000; Williams, 2003;
Ye and Manzo, 2004). Given that the nonprofit labor force is domi-
nated by women, these results are even more troubling. According to
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, more than two-thirds of nonprofit work-
ers are women, compared with about 43 percent of the employed civil-
ian labor force as a whole (Johnston and Rudney, 1987).
Methods
In terms of fundraising professionals, Conry  (1998) summarizes sev-
eral surveys that conclude female fundraisers have not made equal
progress in compensation rates. These findings indicate that (1)
although overall salaries are climbing for fundraisers, women’s pay
consistently lags behind that of men, and (2) women holding senior
management positions in fundraising are still a fraction of their over-
all numbers as a group. These surveys, however, did not control for
the human capital factors traditionally associated with compensa-
tion. The purpose of our study is to test whether a pay gap exists,
controlling for organizational and human capital variables.
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Sample and Data
A national cross-sectional sample consisting of 2,439 fundraising pro-
fessionals across all subsectors of the nonprofit field was collected
through the AFP’s Compensation and Benefits Survey that was
administered once a year for four years. The sample consists of pro-
fessionals who are members of the AFP and are currently employed
in fundraising roles in a nonprofit organization. AFP was founded in
1960 and has approximately twenty-six thousand members in 171
chapters throughout the world.
The respondents are employed in the following types of non-
profits: 27 percent are from education, 5 percent from religious orga-
nizations, 9 percent from social services, 23 percent from arts and
culture, 20 percent from health, and 11 percent are other; 68 percent
are employed full time, 26 percent more than half time, and  2 per-
cent less than half time; 43 percent are in positions as chief develop-
ment officer (CDO), 23 percent deputy director, 20 percent staff, and
8 percent consultant. Mean age of respondents is forty-four; 69 per-
cent of the sample is female, 94 percent white; 24 percent have a
bachelor’s degree, and 49 percent have postgraduate education. The
average number of years employed as a fundraising professional is
14. Most of the respondents (58 percent) have one or more profes-
sional certificates. The average salary in the sample was $70,000 and
ranged as high as $850,000. Bonuses tended to be a small share of
compensation, averaging only 1.2 percent, but they went as high as
25 percent. Most (81 percent) responding organizations did not pay
a bonus. While the average fundraising experience overall is 14 years,
the average with the current particular nonprofit is only 4.5 years, sug-
gesting considerable churning among fundraisers. This turnover may
be a way that fundraisers, particularly women, seek pay equity given
that pay raises occur with job changes. While 24 percent have a con-
tract, only 3 percent received a signing bonus at the time of hire.
Four years of survey data were obtained for the period from 2002
to 2005 from AFP. Each year, AFP conducts a compensation and ben-
efits survey of all its members. The survey asks questions about con-
tributions raised, the organization’s operating budget, bonus and
salary information, and demographic information.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable was compensation. CEO compensation was
operationalized in two ways: base salary and bonus only (over a
twelve-month period). These measures represent total cash provided
to the incumbent and are widely used in the executive compensation
literature. In theory, base salary is used to represent a fixed compo-
nent of total compensation, whereas bonuses vary according to some
measure of performance (Gomez-Mejia, 1994). To adjust for the wide
range of salaries and more closely approximate a normal distribution,
we use logSalary as the measure of salary in the analysis. Bonus is
expressed as the percentage of total compensation.
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Independent Variable
Performance was operationalized as the amount of money raised by
the organization in contributed gifts from all sources in a particular
fiscal year. We use logMoney in the analysis.
Control Variables
The control variables were as follows:
Type of organization. Organizations were coded as (1) educational,
(2) religious, (3) consulting firm, partnership, or sole entrepre-
neurship, (4) health, (5) social service, (6) arts and culture, (7)
other.
Geographic scope. This was coded as (1) international, (2) national,
(3) state, provincial, regional, or (4) local.
Organizational size. Organizational size was (1) operating budget
coded as the log(Budget) for the fiscal year and (2) number of
fundraising support staff.
Region. The location of the organization was coded as (1) United
States or (2) other.
Size of the metropolitan area was a categorical variable indicating pop-
ulation of the metropolitan area, coded as (1) 0 to 500,000, (2)
500,000 to 1 million, (3) 1 million to 3 million, or (4) more than
3 million.
Position in the organization was coded as (1) chief development offi-
cer, (2) deputy director, (3) staff, or (4) consultant.
Experience was coded as the number of years employed as a fundrais-
ing professional as well as experience squared, and number of years
with current employer.
Contract was whether the fundraising professional was under an
employment contract.
Signing bonus was whether the fundraising professional had a sign-
ing bonus when hired.
Recruiter was whether the fundraising professional worked with an
executive recruiter to secure their position.
Age was coded as age and age squared.
Gender was coded as 1  female.
Race was white, black, or other. Black was coded  1 if the respon-
dent self-identified s as black. “Other” was coded  1 if the
respondent indicated that they were a member of a nonblack
minority group.
Education was (1) high school, (2) some college, (3) baccalaureate
degree, or (4) more than the baccalaureate.
Certification was coded as having at least one of the following pro-
fessional certifications: Certified Fundraising Executive (CFRE),
Advanced Certified Fundraising Executive (ACFRE), or Fellow for
the Association of Healthcare Philanthropy (FAHP), or other.
Year was coded as year of the survey. Year 1 is the comparison measure.
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Analysis and Results
The Carroll, Hughes, and Luksetich (2005) study raises the question
of the causality between pay and performance: Do employees work
harder when they are paid more, or do harder-working employees get
paid more? Given this issue of simultaneity and endogeneity, the esti-
mation process is less clear-cut than might be desired. To account for
this, we use a two-stage simultaneous estimation process (2SLS).
Model Used for Analysis
We first estimate compensation using pooled time-series cross-
sectional ordinary least squares (OLS) to find the impact of produc-
tivity and other variables on salary and bonus among different
fundraising positions. We have an unbalanced panel with unmatched
survey respondents each year. Therefore, in order to maximize the
power of the regressions, we include all respondents in each year for
each position and control for year-specific effects, which would cap-
ture differences in the overall macroeconomic effects in a given year.
In order to estimate the effects of performance on pay, we need
to find a measure of performance or productivity that is exogenous
or independent of compensation. To do this, we estimate productiv-
ity (money raised) based on the size of the development budget and
the development staff, as well as the other independent variables we
used to estimate compensation. We use the size of the development
budget and the development staff as instrumental variables to esti-
mate productivity (money raised), because these variables are
arguably related to the amounts raised but unrelated directly to com-
pensation. In the second stage, we use the independently estimated
value of productivity (money raised) as an independent variable to
estimate the pay-for-performance relationship and the effects of the
other independent variables on compensation.
We first examine the relationship between pay and performance
for fundraising professionals and refer to the pooled OLS regression
results in Table 1. Looking first at the results for each position only
(see Table 1), we find that a 10 percent increase in funds raised by
the organization is significantly associated with a 0.9 percent raise in
salary, as well as a significant increase in bonuses for the CDOs. In
addition, deputy directors earned approximately a 0.6 percent
increase in salary for a 10 percent increase in funds raised. Dollars
raised is not significantly related to either of the compensation vari-
ables for staff or consultant, which might be a reflection of either the
indirect effects of these positions or the less precise meaning of con-
sultants.
In Table 2, we provide the estimates of our measure of produc-
tivity (money raised) using LnBudget and Staff (size) as instrumental
variables that are independent of compensation but valid explanatory
variables for productivity. We find that both LnBudget and Staff are
highly significant variables in explaining productivity (money raised)
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across all types of fundraising positions. Given this and the theoret-
ical distinction between their roles in explaining productivity directly
but that they are arguably independent from explaining compensa-
tion directly, we determine that they are valid instrumental variables.
Therefore, we include them in the second stage of our analysis.
Table 3 presents the results of our 2SLS simultaneous estimates.
In this estimate, we find that productivity (LnMoney) has a positive
and significant effect on the salary of each type of fundraising posi-
tion. The strongest effect is for chief development officers, for whom
a 10 percent increase in money raised is associated with a 1.4 percent
increase in salary. Fundraising productivity (LMoney raised) is not
associated with a significant increase in bonuses—except for CDOs.
This may not be too surprising: if any position would have a variable
compensation component, it would be the CDO, who is chiefly
responsible for all aspects of fundraising at the organization. For the
deputy directors, a 10 percent increase in productivity is associated
with a 0.9 percent increase in salary. Staff experienced a similar
change (0.8 percent); there was not a significant association between
pay and performance for consultants.
Our results indicate a statistically significant relationship
between pay and performance for most fundraising positions. Con-
trolling for differences in mission, geographic scope, geographical
population, size of the nonprofit, and so forth, as well as several
human capital variables, we find evidence supportive of the notion
of pay for performance among fundraisers.
Are There Gender Differences in Compensation?
We performed a series of t tests for differences between the means
for men (n  767) and women (n  1,672) fundraisers. Noteworthy
results presented in Table 4 indicate that men have significantly
higher average salaries and larger shares of income from bonuses.
(Men’s bonuses are, on average, over 70 percent higher than those of
women.) Men are more likely than women to serve in educational,
religious, and consulting organizations, whereas women are more
likely to serve in social services and arts and cultural nonprofits. Geo-
graphically men are more likely to work in international and national
nonprofits, and women are more likely to work in local nonprofits.
Men raised significantly more money and worked for organizations
with larger development staffs and budgets. Men also had signifi-
cantly more overall experience as fundraisers (four more years) but
had similar tenures with the current employer. Men were slightly
older (3.6 years) and were almost twice as likely as females to have
been hired through a recruiter. Men were more likely to have signif-
icantly more education than women. Hence, if it were not possible
to refine our analysis further, we might conclude that men are paid
more than women, but they perhaps had earned higher compensa-
tion because, on average, they raise more money, work in larger, more
complex organizations, and have more education than women.
Fundraising
productivity  is
not associated
with a significant
increase in
bonuses—except
for chief
development
officers.
We find evidence
supportive of the
notion of pay for
performance
among
fundraisers.
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Table 4. Test for Equality of Means for Entire Sample
Gender Difference
Males Females
N  767 N  1672 Difference t-stat Significance
Bonus 1.711 0.997 0.714 4.091 ***
(4.358) (3.077)
log(Salary) 11.190 10.927 0.263 8.218 ***
(0.772) (0.638)
Type1—Educational 0.302 0.249 0.053 2.696 **
(0.46) (0.433)
Type2—Religious 0.085 0.038 0.046 4.185 ***
(0.279) (0.192)
Type3—Consulting 0.076 0.045 0.031 2.845 **
Firm, Partnership, or (0.265) (0.207)
Sole Entrepreneurship
Type4—Health 0.213 0.199 0.013 0.754
(0.409) (0.399)
Type5—Social Service 0.057 0.099 0.042 3.762 ***
(0.233) (0.299)
Type6—Arts 0.171 0.257 0.086 4.994 ***
and Culture (0.377) (0.437)
Type7—Other 0.096 0.112 0.015 1.167
(0.295) (0.315)
Scope1— 0.180 0.126 0.054 3.341 ***
International (0.384) (0.332)
Scope2—National 0.197 0.137 0.060 3.599 ***
(0.398) (0.344)
Scope3—State, 0.308 0.309 0.002 0.075
Provincial, Regional (0.462) (0.462)
Scope4—Local 0.310 0.425 0.115 5.571 ***
(0.463) (0.495)
log(Money)— 15.046 14.368 0.679 7.788 ***
Contributions raised (2.033) (1.920)
log(Budget) 15.642 15.268 0.374 4.326 ***
(2.036) (1.854)
Staff 12.928 9.186 3.742 5.392 ***
(16.747) (13.930)
Region—U.S  0.687 0.670 0.017 0.819
1; 0 otherwise (0.464) (0.470)
Area1—Population 0.095 0.097 0.002 0.134
0–0.5 million (0.294) (0.296)
Area2—Population 0.374 0.395 0.021 0.998
0.5–1 million (0.484) (0.489)
Area3—Population 0.272 0.281 0.009 0.442
1–3 million (0.446) (0.450)
Area4—Population 0.258 0.219 0.039 2.059 *
3 million or more (0.438) (0.414)
FTE1—Less than 0.021 0.026 0.005 0.753
half-time (0.143) (0.158)
FTE2—More 0.239 0.266 0.027 1.433
than half-time (0.427) (0.442)
FTE3—Full-time 0.700 0.677 0.023 1.148
(0.458) (0.468)
(Continued)
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By using regression models, we can examine these issues more
rigorously. Table 3 shows that female CDOs are paid approximately
11 percent lower salaries1 than male CDOs (p  .01)—even after
controlling for a wide range of organizational and individual vari-
ables, including dollars raised by the organization. Gender differences
in bonuses for CDOs were not significant. Similarly, female deputy
directors are paid approximately 8 percent less than males (but this
difference only approaches significance, p  .1), and like the CDOs,
there were no significant gender differences in bonuses among the
deputy directors. Female staffers were not paid less in salary than
men but received significantly lower bonuses. Female consultants
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Experience—Years 16.056 12.332 3.724 9.535 ***
employed as fundrais- (9.464) (7.731)
ing professional
Current—Number of 4.501 4.421 0.080 0.537
Years with current (3.414) (3.364)
employer
Contract 0.240 0.236 0.004 0.196
(0.427) (0.425)
Sign 0.030 0.034 0.004 0.540
(0.171) (0.182)
Recruiter 0.369 0.197 0.172 8.626 ***
(0.483) (0.398)
Age 46.497 42.900 3.597 7.033 ***
(11.697) (11.798)
High School 0.025 0.056 0.031 3.888 ***
(0.156) (0.229)
Some College 0.167 0.228 0.061 3.601 ***
(0.373) (0.420)
Baccalaureate 0.249 0.232 0.017 0.906
Degree
(0.433) (0.422)
Post Secondary 0.525 0.476 0.049 2.265 *
(0.500) (0.500)
Certification—at 0.600 0.570 0.030 1.388
least one: (0.490) (0.495)
CFRE, ACFRE, 
FAHP, Other
Year1 0.270 0.261 0.009 0.472
(0.444) (0.439)
Year2 0.231 0.268 0.037 1.989 *
(0.422) (0.443)
Year3 0.252 0.234 0.017 0.914
(0.434) (0.424)
Year4 0.248 0.237 0.011 0.580
(0.432) (0.425)
Table 4. (Continued)
Gender Difference
Males Females
N  767 N  1672 Difference t-stat Significance
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received approximately 36 percent lower salaries than male consul-
tants and were given significantly lower bonuses as well.
Other Determinants of Bonus and Salary
The following is a description of other factors that affect bonus and
salary for fundraising professionals. To simplify our presentation, we
discus only those in our final estimation of the 2SLS process in Table 3
and the results that are statistically significant.
Mission of the Nonprofit. We used education as the reference
group for this set of variables. We found that CDOs in religious non-
profits earn approximately 22 percent lower salaries compared to
education, and deputy directors earn approximately 24 percent less.
Health care fundraisers earn approximately the same salaries as their
peers in education, but health care fundraisers earn significantly
higher bonuses than their counterparts in education. CDOs in arts
and culture nonprofits earn approximately 10 percent less and deputy
directors earn approximately 14 percent less than their educational
counterparts. Deputy directors, staff, and consultants in other sub-
sectors earn substantially less than those in education. CDOs in con-
sulting firms earn less than their educational peers, but there are not
enough consultants in the deputy directors and staff categories to iso-
late an independent effect. Perhaps most surprising is that fundrais-
ers in social services do not earn significantly different salaries or
bonuses than their counterparts in education.
Population of Base City. After controlling for all other factors, we
found no significant differences in the base salaries of fundraisers in
any city size. However, deputy directors in various city sizes were
paid significantly higher bonuses than those living in the smallest
towns (population less than fifty thousand).
Full-Time Status. We find a substantial earnings penalty for those
working less than half-time. For example, CDOs who work less than
half-time earn approximately 34 percent less than full-time CDOs.
While it is somewhat surprising that the pay penalty for those work-
ing less than half-time is less than 50 percent, it may be that CDOs
who are permitted to work less than half-time are highly productive
or very successful, or both. It may be necessary to pay them a pre-
mium relative to the estimated share of salary in order to retain them.
The penalties are even larger for staff and consultants. CDOs who
work more than half-time (but less than full time) are paid approxi-
mately 14 percent less than full-timers. Staff who work more than
half-time are paid substantially higher bonuses.
Hiring Practices. The existence of an employment contract had
no effect for fundraisers’ compensation after holding constant other
variables. Payment of a signing bonus has positive and significant
effect for the base salary of CDOs and approached significance for
deputy directors. Signing bonuses also had a positive and large effect
on the bonuses of CDOs and a small but negative effect on the
bonuses of consultants. Those CDOs, deputy directors, and staffers
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who were hired through a recruiter experienced a significant bump
up in salaries (12 to 23 percent), and CDOs also experienced a sig-
nificant increase in their bonus if they were hired through a recruiter.
Human Capital Effects
We control for and describe here several human capital effects: age,
race, education, certification, and fundraising experience. 
Age. Age captures general human capital for experience, which is
not captured in other human capital variables, and tends to have a
positive and significant effect on both salary and bonuses for all
positions. Age squared is negative and significant, which suggests
a curvilinear effect (diminishing returns).
Race. Race is generally not significant (either black or other) for any
of the positions.
Education. While having some college or even a B.A. or B.S. did not
enhance one’s salary relative to high school graduates (or less),
having postsecondary training has a positive effect on the base
salary of CDOs.
Certification. Having one or more fundraising-related certification
does not have much of an effect on compensation.
Fundraising experience. Surprisingly, fundraising experience has only
a marginally significant and small effect on the bonuses of CDOs,
and that effect is negative while experience squared is positive. Staff
experience is small but positive and significant with respect to base
salary. Tenure with current employer is also somewhat surprisingly
unimportant for both salary and bonus and does not attain statis-
tical significance.
Discussion and Conclusion
The focus of our study was to ascertain the critical factors that
determine compensation for individuals who are employed as
fundraising professionals in nonprofit organizations. In general, our
results indicate that when we control for organizational character-
istics and human capital variables, performance does play a positive
and significant role in determining both salary and bonus, particu-
larly for individuals employed as CDOs. We used instrumental vari-
ables and simultaneous 2SLS to control for the endogeneity
between pay and performance. Our instrumental variables provided
good estimates of productivity, which enabled us to estimate the
exogenous effects of productivity on compensation, holding con-
stant all other variables. Thus, we can be more confident in our
results that suggest performance has a strong and significant effect
on compensation.
Contrary to the conclusions drawn from previous reviews of
the pay-performance relationship in the for-profit sector (for exam-
ple, Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Tosi, Werner, Katz, and
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Gomez-Mejia, 2000), indicating a weak pay-performance correlation,
our study found a significant and positive relationship between
money raised and compensation. This finding is especially com-
pelling in that the ethical standards for fundraising professionals pre-
clude these individuals from being paid on a commission basis.
Although we were not able to ascertain whether the fundraising pro-
fessionals in our sample were operating under explicit performance-
based compensation systems, our results indicate that there appears
to be a pay-performance linkage, suggesting at least implied contracts
rewarding performance based on money raised.
Our finding of a significant pay-performance linkage for fundrais-
ers employed in nonprofits is somewhat unusual. The theoretical lit-
erature suggests that managers and other stakeholders would be
reluctant to tie pay to performance for the following reasons: (1) it is
difficult to measure results in nonprofits, (2) managers self-select to
work in nonprofits and may be more risk averse in terms of compen-
sation, and (3) the trust of donors may be in jeopardy if compensa-
tion is perceived as being too high. Empirical research conducted on
executive pay in nonprofits provides general support for these theo-
retical explanations—where managerial pay is more strongly related
to organizational size than managerial performance (for example,
Hallock, 2002a; Oster, 1998; Pink and Leatt, 1991).
There may be several explanations for our findings. First, for
fundraisers, where a financial measure of performance relates directly
to job responsibilities, pay and performance are more likely to be
related—unlike most managerial positions in nonprofits, where pay
and performance have not found much support in the empirical lit-
erature. Second, individuals who self-select into fundraising roles
may behave more like those in the private sector—less risk averse in
terms of linking their pay to performance. Fundraisers may be act-
ing more like workers in the for-profit sector due to the nature of
their job responsibilities and not sorting in the ways that typically
have been found in nonprofits. These findings suggest the impor-
tance of examining the roles that individuals play in the nonprofit
sector in terms of self-selection.
Our results also indicate a gender-pay gap, even after controlling
for all factors traditionally associated with pay differentials between
males and females. Women fundraising professionals who are CDOs
earn significantly lower salaries then men, female staff earn signifi-
cantly lower bonuses, and consultants earn significantly lower bonus
and salary.
Our research is consistent with the most recent survey conducted
on nonprofit pay that found (1) compensation differences across
types of nonprofits (fundraising professionals employed in the edu-
cation and health areas tend to pay their executives more than other
types of nonprofits), (2) geographical location does not appear to
affect compensation, and (3) size of the nonprofit does not affect
compensation as much as the gender of employees (GuideStar,
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2005). Interestingly, the human capital variables one would expect
to be significantly related to compensation did not have much of an
effect. Fundraising experience was only marginally related to com-
pensation, and tenure with employer had no effect. Race and educa-
tion appear to have little impact as well.
Although the issue of incentive pay for fundraisers is controver-
sial, compensation based on money raised is a relevant and timely
subject for those in the fundraising field. Incentive pay plans are still
relatively rare, but they are becoming more common, especially at
large nonprofits (Gose, 2002). According to results of an online
ethics and compensation survey sent to members of the AFP, 57 per-
cent had reported that they had been asked to consider raising char-
itable funds on a commission basis—even though this practice is
prohibited under the AFP Code of Ethical Principles and Standards
of Professional Practice (Sczudlo, 2003). Furthermore, reports in the
philanthropic and nonprofit field give account of organizations that
use incentive pay to retain top fundraisers on the job (for example,
Gose, 2002). Our study suggests that the pay-performance relation-
ship is present, even though it may not be made explicit in compen-
sation policy. Future research should attempt to quantify whether the
lack of a performance-based system depresses fundraising and focus
on issues of efficiency rather than solely on the ethical concerns—
particularly as pay-for-performance systems are beginning to be
adopted in more nonprofits.
Finally, it is important to understand that “fundraising does not
take place in a vacuum; it is one of the central elements of a larger
system of philanthropy” and is misunderstood if reduced to simply
the act of raising money (Payton, Russo, and Tempel, 1991, p. 4).
Fundraisers rely on the mission of the nonprofit in justifying their
fundraising role and hold themselves accountable to the public
through ethical fundraising practices tied to the mission of the orga-
nization. As such, “fundraising is a moral action . . . that engages
fund raisers in the lives of other people for their benefit or for some
larger public benefit as well as for the benefit of the fund raisers
themselves” (Payton, Russo, and Tempel, 1991, p. 9). Future research
examining the pay-performance relationship for fundraisers needs to
keep in mind the context in which this occurs.
Notes
1. For variables that are logged, we use the elasticities directly from the tables to
facilitate interpretation by the readers. In a log-log or log-level regression model, the
estimates of the regression coefficients can provide an approximation of the per-
centage change of the dependent variable. This approximation is quite accurate if the
regression coefficient is small, but if the coefficient is large, the approximation can
become increasingly inaccurate. This approximation in our results varies from the
true estimate by less than one percentage point in nearly all cases (except a couple
of cases with very large percentage changes) and would not involve a change in either
sign or level or significance.
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